Publications
For my full CV, click here.
Books
Verstehen verstehen. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung.
Forthcoming. E-Book already available with open access: link. Schwabe Verlag (in German).
Forthcoming. E-Book already available with open access: link. Schwabe Verlag (in German).
Articles
Towards Ideal Understanding. (With Mario Hubert.)
Forthcoming in Ergo. Penultimate draft.
Abstract: What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding.
Forthcoming in Ergo. Penultimate draft.
Abstract: What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding.
Understanding Phenomena. From Social to Collective?
Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues 2022 (Nous Supplement). Link to article, Penultimate draft.
Abstract: In making sense of the world, we typically cooperate, join forces, and draw on one another’s competence and expertise. A group or community in which there is a well-functioning division of cognitive-epistemic labor can achieve levels of understanding that a single agent who relies exclusively on her own capacities would probably never achieve. However, is understanding also collective? I.e., is understanding something that can be possessed by a group or community rather than by individuals? In this paper, I develop an account of understanding phenomena according to which understanding a phenomenon requires reasonably endorsing an adequate and intelligible epistemic mediator that accounts for this phenomenon. I then show that understanding, conceived along these lines, can be attributed to collective entities. An important result of my arguments will be that a collective entity’s understanding cannot (always) be reduced to the sum of the understandings of the individuals belonging to it. This is because a collective entity can sometimes be rightfully claimed to understand a phenomenon while none of its individual members understands it.
Forthcoming in Philosophical Issues 2022 (Nous Supplement). Link to article, Penultimate draft.
Abstract: In making sense of the world, we typically cooperate, join forces, and draw on one another’s competence and expertise. A group or community in which there is a well-functioning division of cognitive-epistemic labor can achieve levels of understanding that a single agent who relies exclusively on her own capacities would probably never achieve. However, is understanding also collective? I.e., is understanding something that can be possessed by a group or community rather than by individuals? In this paper, I develop an account of understanding phenomena according to which understanding a phenomenon requires reasonably endorsing an adequate and intelligible epistemic mediator that accounts for this phenomenon. I then show that understanding, conceived along these lines, can be attributed to collective entities. An important result of my arguments will be that a collective entity’s understanding cannot (always) be reduced to the sum of the understandings of the individuals belonging to it. This is because a collective entity can sometimes be rightfully claimed to understand a phenomenon while none of its individual members understands it.
Do We Deserve Credit for Everything We Understand?
Published (2021) in Episteme. Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: It is widely acknowledged in the literature in social epistemology that knowledge has a social dimension: we are epistemically dependent upon one another for most of what we know. Our knowledge can be, and very often is, grounded on the epistemic achievement of somebody else. But what about epistemic aims other than knowledge? What about understanding? Prominent authors argue that understanding is not social in the same way in which knowledge is. Others can put us in the position to understand, but when we understand something, this accomplishment is to be credited mainly if not entirely to us, as it is due to the successful exercise of our own cognitive abilities. In this paper, I show that the social dimension of understanding closely resembles the social dimension of knowledge. I distinguish between three different ways in which a subject can depend upon another subject for (either the acquisition or the possession of) a certain epistemic good. I then argue that all these kinds of epistemic dependence apply to knowledge and understanding alike. If I am right, understanding is not (always) an achievement to be (mainly) credited to the single epistemic agent who understands.
Published (2021) in Episteme. Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: It is widely acknowledged in the literature in social epistemology that knowledge has a social dimension: we are epistemically dependent upon one another for most of what we know. Our knowledge can be, and very often is, grounded on the epistemic achievement of somebody else. But what about epistemic aims other than knowledge? What about understanding? Prominent authors argue that understanding is not social in the same way in which knowledge is. Others can put us in the position to understand, but when we understand something, this accomplishment is to be credited mainly if not entirely to us, as it is due to the successful exercise of our own cognitive abilities. In this paper, I show that the social dimension of understanding closely resembles the social dimension of knowledge. I distinguish between three different ways in which a subject can depend upon another subject for (either the acquisition or the possession of) a certain epistemic good. I then argue that all these kinds of epistemic dependence apply to knowledge and understanding alike. If I am right, understanding is not (always) an achievement to be (mainly) credited to the single epistemic agent who understands.
On Understanding and Testimony
Published (2021) in Erkenntnis . Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Testimony spreads information. It is also commonly agreed that it can transfer knowledge. Whether it can work as an epistemic source of understanding is a matter of dispute. However, testimony certainly plays a pivotal role in the proliferation of understanding in the epistemic community. But how exactly do we learn, and how do we make advancements in understanding on the basis of one another’s words? And what can we do to maximize the probability that the process of acquiring understanding from one another succeeds? These are very important questions in our current epistemological landscape, especially in light of the attention that has been paid to understanding as an epistemic achievement of purely epistemic value. Somewhat surprisingly, the recent literature in social epistemology does not offer much on the topic. The overarching aim of this paper is to provide a tentative model of understanding that goes in-depth enough to safely address the question of how understanding and testimony are related to one another. The hope is to contribute, in some measure, to the effort to understand understanding, and to explain two facts about our epistemic practices: (1) the fact that knowledge and understanding relate differently to testimony, and (2) the fact that some pieces of testimonial information are better than others for the sake of providing one with understanding and of yielding advancements in one’s epistemic standing.
Published (2021) in Erkenntnis . Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Testimony spreads information. It is also commonly agreed that it can transfer knowledge. Whether it can work as an epistemic source of understanding is a matter of dispute. However, testimony certainly plays a pivotal role in the proliferation of understanding in the epistemic community. But how exactly do we learn, and how do we make advancements in understanding on the basis of one another’s words? And what can we do to maximize the probability that the process of acquiring understanding from one another succeeds? These are very important questions in our current epistemological landscape, especially in light of the attention that has been paid to understanding as an epistemic achievement of purely epistemic value. Somewhat surprisingly, the recent literature in social epistemology does not offer much on the topic. The overarching aim of this paper is to provide a tentative model of understanding that goes in-depth enough to safely address the question of how understanding and testimony are related to one another. The hope is to contribute, in some measure, to the effort to understand understanding, and to explain two facts about our epistemic practices: (1) the fact that knowledge and understanding relate differently to testimony, and (2) the fact that some pieces of testimonial information are better than others for the sake of providing one with understanding and of yielding advancements in one’s epistemic standing.
Introduction to the Synthese Topical Collection "True Enough? Themes from Elgin".
Published (2021) in Synthese. Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: This topical collection of Synthese is in honour of Catherine Z. Elgin. The idea for it arose in the context of an international book symposium dedicated to Elgin’s book True Enough (2017), organised by Katherine Dormandy, Christoph Jäger, and myself, which took place at the University of Innsbruck in March 2018. The topical collection comprises fourteen papers addressing a broad array of issues related to True Enough and to Elgin’s work more generally, plus a contribution by Elgin with detailed comments on and replies. True Enough is an extraordinarily rich, wide–ranging book; it reflects both the breadth and the sharpness of Elgin’s philosophical gaze and exemplifies the impressive variety of her philosophical interests. In this introduction, I give an overview of the topical collection’s content, zooming in on those aspects of Elgin’s work which captured the contributors’ attention. My analysis will not remotely do justice to the complexity of Elgin’s system, but I hope it will help the reader navigate the topical collection and appreciate how the fourteen papers relate to Elgin’s overall project.
Published (2021) in Synthese. Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: This topical collection of Synthese is in honour of Catherine Z. Elgin. The idea for it arose in the context of an international book symposium dedicated to Elgin’s book True Enough (2017), organised by Katherine Dormandy, Christoph Jäger, and myself, which took place at the University of Innsbruck in March 2018. The topical collection comprises fourteen papers addressing a broad array of issues related to True Enough and to Elgin’s work more generally, plus a contribution by Elgin with detailed comments on and replies. True Enough is an extraordinarily rich, wide–ranging book; it reflects both the breadth and the sharpness of Elgin’s philosophical gaze and exemplifies the impressive variety of her philosophical interests. In this introduction, I give an overview of the topical collection’s content, zooming in on those aspects of Elgin’s work which captured the contributors’ attention. My analysis will not remotely do justice to the complexity of Elgin’s system, but I hope it will help the reader navigate the topical collection and appreciate how the fourteen papers relate to Elgin’s overall project.
The Social Fabric of Understanding: Authority, Equilibrium, and Epistemic Empathy. (With Christoph Jäger.)
Published (2021) in Synthese. Link to article.
Abstract: We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that, properly reconstructed and developed, it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that epistemic authorities must possess in order to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.
Published (2021) in Synthese. Link to article.
Abstract: We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that, properly reconstructed and developed, it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that epistemic authorities must possess in order to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.
Can Testimony Transmit Understanding?
Published (2020) in Theoria (Sweden). Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Can we transmit understanding via testimony in more or less the same way in which we transmit knowledge? The standard view in social epistemology has a straightforward answer: no, we cannot. Three arguments supporting the standard view have been formulated so far. The first appeals to the claim that gaining understanding requires a greater cognitive effort than acquiring testimonial knowledge does. The second appeals to a certain type of epistemic trust that is supposedly characteristic of knowledge transmission (and maybe of the transmission of epistemic goods in general) and that is allegedly incompatible with understanding. The third aims to show that there is a certain aspect of understanding (what epistemologists these days like to call “grasping”) that cannot be passed on to another person via testimony alone. In this article, I show that all of these arguments can be resisted. Thus, there seem to be no compelling reasons to embrace the standard view.
See the reply by Eric Gilbertson, Understanding by Testimony: A Reply to Malfatti. Published (2020) in Theoria (Sweden). Link to article.
Published (2020) in Theoria (Sweden). Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Can we transmit understanding via testimony in more or less the same way in which we transmit knowledge? The standard view in social epistemology has a straightforward answer: no, we cannot. Three arguments supporting the standard view have been formulated so far. The first appeals to the claim that gaining understanding requires a greater cognitive effort than acquiring testimonial knowledge does. The second appeals to a certain type of epistemic trust that is supposedly characteristic of knowledge transmission (and maybe of the transmission of epistemic goods in general) and that is allegedly incompatible with understanding. The third aims to show that there is a certain aspect of understanding (what epistemologists these days like to call “grasping”) that cannot be passed on to another person via testimony alone. In this article, I show that all of these arguments can be resisted. Thus, there seem to be no compelling reasons to embrace the standard view.
See the reply by Eric Gilbertson, Understanding by Testimony: A Reply to Malfatti. Published (2020) in Theoria (Sweden). Link to article.
Can Testimony Generate Understanding?
Published (2019) in Social Epistemology . Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Can we gain understanding from testifiers who themselves fail to understand? At first glance, this looks counter-intuitive. How could a hearer with a poor understanding of a certain subject matter, or none at all, non–accidentally extract information relevant to understanding from a speaker’s testimony if the speaker does not understand what she is talking about? This paper shows that, when there are theories or representational devices working as mediators, speakers can intentionally generate understanding in their hearers by engaging in relevant speech acts without understanding the topic of these speech acts themselves. More specifically, I argue that testifiers can intentionally elicit understanding of empirical phenomena in their hearers even if they themselves lack such understanding – provided that they properly understand the epistemic mediators involved.
Published (2019) in Social Epistemology . Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Can we gain understanding from testifiers who themselves fail to understand? At first glance, this looks counter-intuitive. How could a hearer with a poor understanding of a certain subject matter, or none at all, non–accidentally extract information relevant to understanding from a speaker’s testimony if the speaker does not understand what she is talking about? This paper shows that, when there are theories or representational devices working as mediators, speakers can intentionally generate understanding in their hearers by engaging in relevant speech acts without understanding the topic of these speech acts themselves. More specifically, I argue that testifiers can intentionally elicit understanding of empirical phenomena in their hearers even if they themselves lack such understanding – provided that they properly understand the epistemic mediators involved.
On the Epistemological Potential of Worrall's Structural Realism
Published (2018) in Philosophical Inquiries . Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Structural realism à-la-Worrall is the view that inasmuch as our scientific theories provide us with (partially) adequate descriptions of an objective and independent reality, they do so by shedding light on the way this reality is in itself structured, and not on the so-called nature of existing objects. This position seems to imply that there is something about reality that lies beyond our grasp. I will reconstruct and shed new light onto Worrall’s position and show that, contrary to how it might appear at first sight, its allegedly negative, or pessimist stance has a positive side: by placing a constraint on our (theoretically mediated) knowledge, structural realism might tell us something relevant about the nature and functioning of our scientific understanding of the world. The paper is divided in three parts. The first part is devoted to a brief reconstruction of Worrall’s position. In the second part, I propose a new reading of the position in question by uncovering, highlighting and developing its epistemological consequences. In the last part, I investigate and scrutinise the connection between understanding and structures. The overall aim is to show how Worrall’s structural realism, especially in the reading I am proposing here, may provide us with a plausible explanation of the epistemic value of past and actual scientific theories.
Published (2018) in Philosophical Inquiries . Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Structural realism à-la-Worrall is the view that inasmuch as our scientific theories provide us with (partially) adequate descriptions of an objective and independent reality, they do so by shedding light on the way this reality is in itself structured, and not on the so-called nature of existing objects. This position seems to imply that there is something about reality that lies beyond our grasp. I will reconstruct and shed new light onto Worrall’s position and show that, contrary to how it might appear at first sight, its allegedly negative, or pessimist stance has a positive side: by placing a constraint on our (theoretically mediated) knowledge, structural realism might tell us something relevant about the nature and functioning of our scientific understanding of the world. The paper is divided in three parts. The first part is devoted to a brief reconstruction of Worrall’s position. In the second part, I propose a new reading of the position in question by uncovering, highlighting and developing its epistemological consequences. In the last part, I investigate and scrutinise the connection between understanding and structures. The overall aim is to show how Worrall’s structural realism, especially in the reading I am proposing here, may provide us with a plausible explanation of the epistemic value of past and actual scientific theories.
Scientific Realism as the Most Reasonable Choice?
Published (2018) in Isonomia . Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Scientific realism, roughly, is the view that successful scientific theories are (at least partially, or approximately) true. Is this the most reasonable stance to assume towards science? The no-miracle argument says it is: the stunning empirical success of our scientific theories is in need of an explanation, and (partial, or approximate) truth seems to be the best explanation that we have at hand. The aim of this paper is to briefly reconstruct the trajectory the success–to–truth inference, to critically analyse it in its latest formulation, and to sketch a possible way to go in order to make it a safer inference.
Published (2018) in Isonomia . Link to article, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Scientific realism, roughly, is the view that successful scientific theories are (at least partially, or approximately) true. Is this the most reasonable stance to assume towards science? The no-miracle argument says it is: the stunning empirical success of our scientific theories is in need of an explanation, and (partial, or approximate) truth seems to be the best explanation that we have at hand. The aim of this paper is to briefly reconstruct the trajectory the success–to–truth inference, to critically analyse it in its latest formulation, and to sketch a possible way to go in order to make it a safer inference.
Book Chapters
Understanding and Transmission
Forthcoming in The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Penultimate draft.
Abstract: Testimony spreads information. It is also widely acknowledged that it can transfer, maybe even generate, propositional knowledge. But what about other epistemic goods? Knowledge of individual propositions is certainly very important to us. In many domains, however, we want more than just collecting knowledge about isolated items of fact. We also want to see how things hang together. We want to grasp the reason(s) why things are the way they are and not otherwise. We want to understand the subject matter of what we believe. What is the role of testimony in the process of disseminating understanding in an epistemic community? Can understanding be testimonially transmitted from one epistemic agent to another? Pessimists about understanding transmission believe that everything testimony can do is to lay the groundwork for understanding. When a speaker tells or explains something to a hearer, she plants, so to say, the seed of understanding. Whether the seed then grows and flourishes or dries up and perishes in the soil, however, is not in the speaker’s hands; it is only up to the hearer. Optimists, on the other hand, believe that testimony can do more than lay the groundwork for understanding. Under certain conditions, it can work as an epistemic source of understanding. In this entry, I sketch a model of understanding that could be embraced by pessimists and optimists alike (section 2). After having analyzed what it means for an epistemic good to be transmitted via testimony (section 3), I will argue that there is more room for optimism than for pessimism. Understanding, conceived along the lines I suggest, can be very probably transmitted via testimony (section 4). I conclude by showing how pessimists might resist this conclusion (section 5).
Forthcoming in The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Penultimate draft.
Abstract: Testimony spreads information. It is also widely acknowledged that it can transfer, maybe even generate, propositional knowledge. But what about other epistemic goods? Knowledge of individual propositions is certainly very important to us. In many domains, however, we want more than just collecting knowledge about isolated items of fact. We also want to see how things hang together. We want to grasp the reason(s) why things are the way they are and not otherwise. We want to understand the subject matter of what we believe. What is the role of testimony in the process of disseminating understanding in an epistemic community? Can understanding be testimonially transmitted from one epistemic agent to another? Pessimists about understanding transmission believe that everything testimony can do is to lay the groundwork for understanding. When a speaker tells or explains something to a hearer, she plants, so to say, the seed of understanding. Whether the seed then grows and flourishes or dries up and perishes in the soil, however, is not in the speaker’s hands; it is only up to the hearer. Optimists, on the other hand, believe that testimony can do more than lay the groundwork for understanding. Under certain conditions, it can work as an epistemic source of understanding. In this entry, I sketch a model of understanding that could be embraced by pessimists and optimists alike (section 2). After having analyzed what it means for an epistemic good to be transmitted via testimony (section 3), I will argue that there is more room for optimism than for pessimism. Understanding, conceived along the lines I suggest, can be very probably transmitted via testimony (section 4). I conclude by showing how pessimists might resist this conclusion (section 5).
Epistemic Authority
Forthcoming in The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Penultimate draft.
Abstract: Sally is hiking in the forest with her dad. While she is about to pick what she takes to be a beautiful porcino mushroom, her dad warns her: “Careful, that is a poisonous boletus satanas!” Sally’s dad has decades of experience in picking mushrooms and is extremely skillful – much more skillful than Sally is – in recognizing edible ones. Sally is aware of this. She therefore readily comes to believe that what she was about to pick is a poisonous mushroom and walks away. It is quite intuitive that Sally does the right thing. She behaves epistemically as she should, because her dad is better epistemically positioned than she is in the relevant domain. We might call him her epistemic authority as far as mushrooms are concerned. But what exactly does this involve? What makes Sally’s dad an epistemic authority for his daughter? Sally’s dad is certainly no disciplinary expert in the mushroom domain. And yet his word is authoritative, i.e., has special epistemic weight for Sally. How is epistemic authority different than expertise? Sally is no complete amateur as far as mushrooms are concerned. She probably had what she took to be very good reasons to believe that what she was about to pick was a porcino mushroom. When she aligns to her dad’s view, what happens (and what should happen) to her existing reasons and her take on the matter? The structure of this entry is the following. Section 2 gives a brief explication of the notion of epistemic authority. Section 3 clarifies the relation between epistemic authority and expertise. Section 4 tackles the question of how we should reasonably react in realizing that our epistemic authority holds a certain view.
Forthcoming in The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Penultimate draft.
Abstract: Sally is hiking in the forest with her dad. While she is about to pick what she takes to be a beautiful porcino mushroom, her dad warns her: “Careful, that is a poisonous boletus satanas!” Sally’s dad has decades of experience in picking mushrooms and is extremely skillful – much more skillful than Sally is – in recognizing edible ones. Sally is aware of this. She therefore readily comes to believe that what she was about to pick is a poisonous mushroom and walks away. It is quite intuitive that Sally does the right thing. She behaves epistemically as she should, because her dad is better epistemically positioned than she is in the relevant domain. We might call him her epistemic authority as far as mushrooms are concerned. But what exactly does this involve? What makes Sally’s dad an epistemic authority for his daughter? Sally’s dad is certainly no disciplinary expert in the mushroom domain. And yet his word is authoritative, i.e., has special epistemic weight for Sally. How is epistemic authority different than expertise? Sally is no complete amateur as far as mushrooms are concerned. She probably had what she took to be very good reasons to believe that what she was about to pick was a porcino mushroom. When she aligns to her dad’s view, what happens (and what should happen) to her existing reasons and her take on the matter? The structure of this entry is the following. Section 2 gives a brief explication of the notion of epistemic authority. Section 3 clarifies the relation between epistemic authority and expertise. Section 4 tackles the question of how we should reasonably react in realizing that our epistemic authority holds a certain view.
Der Wert des Wissens. (With Christoph Jäger.)
Published (2019) in Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie . Link to chapter, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie beschäftigte sich vor allem mit drei großen Fragen. (i) Was ist Wissen? (ii) Ist Wissen möglich und in welchen Bereichen und in welchem Umfang können wir es, wenn überhaupt, erwerben? (iii) Was sind die Quellen des Wissens, und spielen womöglich einige von ihnen (etwa Wahrnehmung oder Introspektion) eine besondere Rolle für die Fundierung epistemischer Systeme? Neben der Einbeziehung sozialer Wissensquellen in die Behandlung von Frage (iii) ist in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten auch ein weiteres Thema in den Fokus erkenntnistheoretischer Debatten gerückt. Wir streben nach Wissen und versuchen, es zu erhalten und zu vermehren. Wenn wir einer Person Wissen zuschreiben, so schwingen außerdem oft Anerkennung, gar Lob oder Bewunderung mit, Einstellungen, die wir Überzeugungen, die kein Wissen sind, vielfach versagen. Nicht zuletzt die anhaltende Beschäftigung der Philosophie selbst seit Platon mit den Fragen (i) bis (iii) scheint zu zeigen, dass wir Wissen als ein wertvolles Gut betrachten. Eine weitere wichtige epistemologische Frage lautet daher (iv): Worin liegt der besondere Wert des Wissens?
Published (2019) in Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie . Link to chapter, penultimate draft.
Abstract: Die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie beschäftigte sich vor allem mit drei großen Fragen. (i) Was ist Wissen? (ii) Ist Wissen möglich und in welchen Bereichen und in welchem Umfang können wir es, wenn überhaupt, erwerben? (iii) Was sind die Quellen des Wissens, und spielen womöglich einige von ihnen (etwa Wahrnehmung oder Introspektion) eine besondere Rolle für die Fundierung epistemischer Systeme? Neben der Einbeziehung sozialer Wissensquellen in die Behandlung von Frage (iii) ist in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten auch ein weiteres Thema in den Fokus erkenntnistheoretischer Debatten gerückt. Wir streben nach Wissen und versuchen, es zu erhalten und zu vermehren. Wenn wir einer Person Wissen zuschreiben, so schwingen außerdem oft Anerkennung, gar Lob oder Bewunderung mit, Einstellungen, die wir Überzeugungen, die kein Wissen sind, vielfach versagen. Nicht zuletzt die anhaltende Beschäftigung der Philosophie selbst seit Platon mit den Fragen (i) bis (iii) scheint zu zeigen, dass wir Wissen als ein wertvolles Gut betrachten. Eine weitere wichtige epistemologische Frage lautet daher (iv): Worin liegt der besondere Wert des Wissens?
Edited Volumes
True Enough? Themes from Elgin.
Synthese, Topical Collection. (Guest editor with Christoph Jäger). Link.
Synthese, Topical Collection. (Guest editor with Christoph Jäger). Link.